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Abstract 
  The recent global financial crisis has reopened the debate about macroeconomic policies’ objectives, 
but also the need and extent of state involvement in the functioning of the economy, either directly or indirectly. 
This has exposed some weaknesses in the system of regulation and supervision of the financial system and the its 
architecture, especially in the treatment of systemic risks and vulnerabilities, but also the financial implications 
of the globalization process. The global nature of financial crisis highlighted the fact that, although integrated 
financial markets offer a number of significant benefits, risks involved are not negligible. Therefore, to ensure 
the financial stability of an increasingly integrated landscape there was felt the need for reform of the financial 
system architecture, both nationally and internationally. 
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Introduction 
  History shows that in capitalist economies phases of economic expansion alternate  with periods of 
recession.  Thus,  even  in  the  highest  phases  of  expansion  that  took  place  from  mid  1990  to  the  subprime 
mortgage crisis in the summer of 2007, it was understood that a crisis would strike one day the world economy. 
However, no one anticipated the magnitude of its anticipated. Depth of the current recession and the amazing 
speed with which it spread internationally seems to surpass even the most pessimistic scenarios. In fact, to find a 
crisis similar in magnitude and effects should go back to the Great Depression of the 1930s. What is not clear is 
whether what has been learned from that crisis is useful for solving the current crisis. 
  The current crisis has reopened debate on the focus of macroeconomic policies on asset price booms 
and increasing indebtedness. It has also highlighted the shortcomings of national systems of supervision and 
regulation of financial systems and showed how the international financial architecture has failed to incorporate 
with sufficient speed the integration of international financial system. Thus, recent events have brought new 
challenges for financial supervision and regulation of the financial system. 
  While  traditional  business  of  commercial  banks  continue  to  dominate  the  global  landscape,  the 
integration  has  increased  banks'  exposure  to  systemic  risk  and  the  ever  closer  links  between  international 
financial intermediaries increased the likelihood of contagion phenomena. Increasing number of multinational 
financial  institutions  increased  the  number  of  institutions  seen  as  too  big  to  fail.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
amplification of the financial innovation process increased the need for strengthening and expanding regulatory 
framework and oversight of this segment. All these developments emphasize the need for rethinking of the 
financial supervisory system. 
  Internationally, opinions are divided between those who advocate for more active involvement of the 
state in  the economy  in  general and the  financial  system in particular and those  who argue that crises are 
imminent (they cannot be avoided and existing remedies simply will develop roots of new crises). However, it is 
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apparent that the regulatory  discussion forums  focused on two directions: to address  the current crises and 
reforming the supervisory and regulatory systems in the long term. 
 
1. Specific dimensions of the regulatory and supervisory framework 
  The financial system is usually subject to two forms of control, the control achieved by regulating the 
activity, thus indicating the role of various financial institutions and prudential supervision. In particular, the 
banking system is exposed to any third form of control exercised by the central bank, through its monetary 
policy instruments.  
  By  regulation,  in  a  broad  sense,  one  can  understand  the  supervision  and  control  exercised  by  the 
government on the activities of private companies aiming to efficiency, reliability and safety (Bannock and 
Manser, 1990, p. 172).  In a narrower sense, unlike legislation, which refers to rules governing the conduct of 
financial service providers, monitoring is designed to verify compliance (Barth et. all., 2006). Liberal economists 
have promoted the idea of laissez-faire market in the belief that once market forces are left  free to run the 
economy will function effectively without the intervention of the state. However, there are areas of the economy 
that sees a need for state involvement in the guidance and direction to verify the consequences of developments 
in these areas have on the economy.   
  Financial services and companies providing such services, as well as financial markets, are regulated 
and  supervised  throughout  the  world  in  a  far  greater  extent  than  other  categories  of  products  and  services 
(exception can make only those that may affect public health and safety). Reasons for increased regulation and 
oversight of the financial system are the negative consequences that the financial system failures have on people, 
companies, and the economy in general.  
  The  state  regulates  financial  system,  more  obvious  or  less  obvious,  for  centuries.  Regulating  the 
financial system took various forms over time as market entry restrictions, controls on products offered and the 
assets held, restrictions on the prices received or paid, etc. (Benston, 1998, p. 14).  Both, participants in financial 
markets and products offered on the market conditions were to be approved and, in some countries, they were 
even restricted. While countries such as Germany, have allowed banks, for more than a century, to offer a wide 
range of financial products, in other countries like the U.S., these institutions were strictly controlled. In the U.S., 
since 1933, the Glass-Steagall Act separated commercial and investment banks, prohibiting commercial banks to 
underwrite and to transact any class of securities, except government and municipal bonds, although in most 
other countries, such practices were allowed (Benston, 1998, p. 15). 
   As  both  commercial  activities,  as  well  as  financial  ones,  have  started  to  become  increasingly 
international, the regulatory and supervisory process of financial institutions with international activity had to 
adapt to the new trends. Thus, the national regulatory bodies, which were monitoring financial activities, had to 
coordinate their activities with those of other countries, seeking a harmonization of the rules. Thus, the Basel 
Accord  has  developed  a  unique  regulatory  framework  for  banks'  capital,  a  framework  adopted  by  most 
developed  countries,  not  only  for  banks  with  international  activity,  but  to  all  banks  that  operated  in  those 
countries. There have also been proposed uniform capital requirements for companies on the capital markets and 
the intensifying of cooperation between the regulatory bodies on banking and capital markets.   
  Although it is apparent that the banking sector, as part of the financial system, is not the only one to 
direct the legislation, one can say that, this sector was oldest and most highly regulated sector. We believe the 
evolution of financial system structure, with a predominance of the banking sector, is one of the arguments for 
this. Even in economies with developed financial markets, banks remain the center of economic activity in 
general and financial ones in particular, standing out from other institutions through their role as providers of 
payment  services,  in  the  money  creation  process  and  through  the  role  played  in  the  monetary  policy 
transmission.  
  The design of regulatory and supervisory system of the financial system is not an easy task because one 
must take account of the important functions they perform in the system and economy, so as not to disrupt the 
achievement of these functions. Therefore, a key element in designing the regulatory system is to check what it 
wants to achieve by imposing a particular behavior or inducing a particular behavior. Thus, there are two 
approaches to the regulatory process: direct and indirect.  
  The direct approach is to restrict the activities of financial institutions, in an explicit way. Although the 
benefit  of  this  approach  is  clearly  restriction  of  potential  negative  consequences  of  the  actions  of  financial 
intermediaries  and  other  financial  market  participants,  it  is  however  not  without  risks,  one  of  which  is  the 
inhibition in the development of financial activities, or even the possibility of regulatory inefficiency in the new 
developments. The other approach, indirect, does not draw limitations on market participants, but rather brings 
specific incentives designed to induce good behavior, but also desirable for regulators. The aim of this approach 
can be judged as higher pricing undesirable actions of financial institutions. An example of this is to limit risky 
activities by imposing an indicator of capital adequacy based on the risk category of activities involved, is more 
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stimulating as compared to restricting the employment of risky operations. The high quality of information 
available to the regulator gives a prerequisite for the proper functioning of the indirect approach. Therefore, it is 
necessary, in this context, promoting market discipline of the participants in the financial system as well as a 
well-defined legal structure.  
  Existing regulations, regarding the financial system cannot be seen as strictly following one of the two 
approaches, but rather there is a combination of those two, however a different combination depending on each 
country. In general, developed countries tend more towards an indirect approach, while the least developed and 
transition countries are forced to impose clear restrictions, at least for a certain period, therefore the direct 
approach gaining greater importance than the indirect one.  
  The reasons are necessary to regulate the financial system, regardless of the approach taken by the 
authorities, primarily relate to consumer protection and prevention of market failure. A difference from the 
regulation of other sectors is that at most times, the financial supervision and regulation authority is itself a 
participant in the financial market. 
Supervision of financial institutions is done both at the individual level and at the level of the entire financial 
system,  thus  making  the  distinction  between  aggregate  and  individual  supervision.  In  terms  of  individual 
supervision, it can be further divided into official and private supervision. In terms of official supervision of 
financial institutions can say that it takes place along two axes: 
  prudential supervision 
  conduct of business supervision 
  Holopainen (2007) finds the objective of prudential supervision of financial system in promoting safety 
and soundness of financial institutions, the systemic evaluation of their risk profile and risk-taking capacity, so 
that it can ensure their solvency. Regarding the supervision of business conduct, by promoting a fair, non-
discriminatory and transparent behavior, as well as promoting market discipline of the institution, the intention is 
to protect investors and consumers.  
  A  quality  prudential  supervision  is  a  necessary  but  not  sufficient  condition  for  a  healthy  financial 
system. Other conditions are for example:  
  ensuring a stable macroeconomic framework, enabling financial market participants to make accurate 
assessments of business prospects, and thus to increase the chances of repayment of the funds necessary 
for business plans;  
  a functional legal system, to ensure compliance with contract provisions;  
  an  accounting  system  based  on  correct  principles,  to  ensure  a  realistic  assessment  of  the  assets  of 
financial institutions (to allow investors and depositors to make correct decisions on relations  with 
them) and companies (for loans granted by banks to be based on realistic analysis) ;  
  a fair system of taxation on profits, allowing tax deduction for risk provisions for bad loans and other 
banking specific risks; 
  disengagement of the state from the banking sector so that credit be granted on grounds of prudence, not 
on political grounds; 
  the  existence  of  a  well-developed  non-bank  financial  system  (capital  market,  leasing  companies, 
insurance, etc.) so banks will not be forced to perform roles that they are not prepared for.  
  A  problem  that  appears  in  the  financial  system's  regulatory  activity  is  a  possible  reduction  of 
profitability of financial institutions and a reduction of the innovation process. An excessive regulation can also 
affect system performance and financial stability. On the other hand, an efficient and good regulatory oversight 
and  risk  management  can  contribute  to  management  of  vulnerabilities  and  risks,  with  beneficial  effects  on 
stability. 
  The  quality  of  financial  system  supervision  is  important  not  only  to  protect  clients'  interests.  By 
providing entry and maintaining in the system only those participants who meet the standards of prudential 
supervision helps to direct financial resources to healthy sectors of the economy, capable of growth in terms of 
efficiency. 
 
2.  Vulnerabilities highlighted by the global financial crisis 
  The recent financial crisis, that has stuck in 2007 the world economy and still persists to this day, is a 
remarkable mix of factors, both new and old, that have seen before in a serious of smaller scale  financial crisis: 
a) asset prices that have increased to become unsustainable; 
b) credit booms that have increased the debt to new levels unseen before; 
c) the accumulation of systemic risk in the lending process; 
d) the inability of the supervision and regulation to contain the wide spread effects of the crisis. 
  However, the recent crisis had turned up with new factors that gave it the global magnitude that we are 
still seeing today: 
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e) the widespread use of toxic assets; 
f) the interconnectivity among the global financial markets; 
g) the central role that the housing sector played in this crisis, with all its implications. 
  Some authors, (Claessens et all 2010) consider that the catalyst of the crisis was the US overloaded 
housing and mortgage markets, with its increased securitization, and the increasing share of subprime loans 
within the lending activity between 2000 - 2006 (Figure 1) 
 
Figure 1 - Prime and subprime loans  
 
Sources: HMDA, IMF staff estimates. 
 
  The  subprime  loan  crisis  has  affected  the  entire  U.S.  financial  system  and  a  good  part  of  the 
international financial markets.  The increase in mortgage arrears can be explained, to a large extent, by how 
smooth and even fraudulent the granting of loans on this market was, together with a key role in creating a 
framework for easy development and emergence of the crisis played by the process of financial innovation 
(Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2 - Mortgage securitization  
 
Source: IMF staff estimates 
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  Today, the supervisory authorities reassess their financial system supervision framework. Although the 
wave of reforms in financial system supervision architecture began about 10-15 years ago, in the light of the 
current crisis, reform of financial system surveillance appears to be imminent. Thus it can be argued that the 
need for reform stems from the fact that the main objective of monitoring the financial system, found in limiting 
financial institutions’ exposure to risk, is hampered by the esoteric nature of the instruments offered by financial 
institutions and, on the other hand, the probability of radical change in the degree of exposure. Due to the rapid 
changes in the risk exposure profile of institutions, the effectiveness of traditional methods of supervision and 
prudential regulation is significantly reduced. Therefore, the need to reform the process was one of the themes 
currently discussed by international organizations and forums (1) . 
 
TUAC (2) argues that, in light of current events, there is a need for both increased regulation and supervision of 
financial markets in order to adapt to the needs of the real economy. Regulatory process should aim to promote 
responsibility among institutions and markets as well as social protection objectives. 
  The  need  for  change  is  felt  to  provide  better  coverage  through  regulation  and  supervision  of 
international  financial  markets  and  to  ensure  better  cooperation  between  institutions,  nationally  and 
internationally, for the early detection of risky behaviors of participants in the national and international financial 
market. Furthermore, the new framework should address the global financial system’s weaknesses that have led 
to, or have intensified the crisis: 
  Unsustainable growth model;  
  Accelerating the process of financial innovation that gave rise to an uncontrolled structured finance 
industry; the risks were not spread out, but concealed, the pace of innovation in this area went beyond 
the companies' ability to assess risks in derivatives, and the ability of supervisors and regulators to 
monitor;  
  Institutional arbitrage between jurisdictions and financial institutions, which helped to blur the border 
between  the  regulated  and  shadow  banking  system,  allowing  financial  groups  to  practice  a  double 
accounting,  using  off-balance  sheet  transactions,  also  encouraging  irresponsible  risk-taking,  and 
investment strategies based on the leverage;  
  Prevalence of shareholder value over market integrity and long term interests;  
  Poor  quality  assessment  of  loans  that  were  transferred  to  other  entities  through  the  process  of 
securitization;  
  Lack of supervision of systemic risk - although the increase in indebtedness and the underestimation of 
credit risk have been identified before the crisis, their magnitude and implications for systemic risk was 
underestimated. There has also been found a failure in determining the connections between regulated 
and unregulated market participants;  
  Weaknesses in the rating agencies - has seen a very high trust in rating agencies, failure in the models 
and methodologies used by them, and conflicts of interest in the rating process; 
  Procyclical tendencies, fed by the existing regulatory framework and accounting procedures; 
  Weaknesses in risk management practices, techniques and models using historical data based on short 
periods, unsuitable for estimating the likelihood and size distribution of potential losses from credit risk 
through structured products. More high compensation encouraged excessive risk-taking, without prior 
analysis of long-term risks; 
  Weaknesses in the framework of disseminating information about the risks involved, thus undermining 
public confidence; 
  Inadequate procedures for solving the problems of ailing institutions; 
  Lack of transparency in OTC markets. 
  It is considered essential that regulatory and standardization bodies put efforts to achieve a prudential 
regulatory framework designed to protect the stability of financial institutions. Feeble regulation and supervision, 
such as those relating to the underwriting standards in the U.S. mortgage market have aggravated the current 
crisis, making it essential to strengthen prudential regulation and provision by the individual national regulatory 
authorities of a first line of defense in preventing imbalances in the financial system. (G-20, 2009) 
 
3. Developments in the regulatory and supervisory framework at the international level 
  In  response  to  increased  financial  instability,  some  countries  have  adopted  a  series  of  measures, 
including the provision of comprehensive packages to recapitalize the banking system, ad  hoc  measures  to 
recapitalization or providing emergency funds to individual financial institutions, deposit insurance and ensure 
that any financial institution will not be allowed to go bankrupt.  
  Some proposals have even considered it appropriate to establish a global regulatory framework for the 
financial system. G-20 does not support the idea of establishing a global forum for regulators, but rather the 
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voluntary cooperation and coordination of regulatory measures and supervision of national regulatory bodies. 
The principles underlying the G-20 recommendations are:  
  strengthening transparency and accountability by promoting market discipline;  
  promoting sound legislation through prudential supervision and risk management; 
  promoting market integrity and investor financiered the consumer;  
  promoting international cooperation;  
  reforming the international financial institutions, by increasing the role of the Financial Stability Forum 
and the promotion of representation of poorer countries 
Although many measures have been taken to address weaknesses in the supervisory and regulation framework, it 
is still felt the need for reinforcements of the frame. The measures taken so far, following proposals made by the 
G-20 in 2008, can be grouped as follows (G-20, 2009):  
  Measures to remedy the problems caused by the current market and procedure transparency. Some 
authorities  with  responsibilities  in  providing  accounting  standards  published  guidelines  intended  to  clarify 
expectations for the valuation of financial instruments, including complex securities. The supervisory authorities 
have also encouraged international institutions’ work to improve the dissemination of information by adopting 
the practice of disseminating information about proposed exposures of the Financial Stability Forum in its 2007 
report. It can be argued that the response of the  financial institutions  was to disseminate  more  meaningful 
information about exposure to risks of complex financial instruments (both quantitatively and qualitatively). The 
BCBS (International Monetary Fund, 2009) has made public the proposals to strengthen the standards offered by 
Pillar 3 of the Agreement through an improved dissemination of information related to securitization activities 
carried out by banks.  
  Medium and long term measures on:  
o  regulatory regimes - IOSCO (3), IAIS (4) and BCBS (5) have promoted initiatives to address 
regulatory  differences  between  different  sectors,  to  identify  shortcomings  of  the  regulatory  process  and  to 
identify issues related to the expansion of the regulatory process’s objective. Revised IOSCO Code of Conduct 
for Credit Rating Agencies in May 2008, developed a framework of coordination between regulatory bodies to 
ensure that the requirements in the Code are met. In addition, some jurisdictions are in the process of adopting 
laws designed to regulate credit rating agencies (G-20, 2009). The rating agencies have played an important role 
in the triggering of the crisis.  A feature of this sector is the lack of a consistent standard for assessing the ratings 
for structured securities.  Lack of such a standard of evaluation may lead to arbitrary decisions.  The first that 
recognized, post-factum, the regulatory gaps, is the current president of Moody's, Brian Clarkson.  The lack of 
single standards of evaluation, the lack of legislation to penalize the assessment practices that allow changing the 
rating from one day to another, the lack of competition, the conflict of interest that appears at the financing of a 
ratings evaluation project, are sufficient grounds to trigger a crisis of loan markets. Rating agencies were in no 
position to rate securitized transactions (CDO and MBS), backed by subprime mortgages.  The high ratings 
given to these securities were justified by various improvements in the lending sector, by the greater value of the 
collateral than of the loan itself, as well as by the existence of the investors in securities willing to take over the 
risk of losses.  On the other hand, rating agencies have asserted that they only took into account the risk of 
default, and not liquidity risk or  market risk,  which investors often tend to neglect.    Some critics of these 
agencies  say  that  conflicts  of  interest  also  appeared  in  this  process,  because  rating  agencies  are  paid  by 
companies  that  organizes  and  place  such  instruments  to  investors,  companies  like  investment  banks.    On 
June11th 2008, the Securities and Exchange Commission in the USA has proposed a set of rules designed to 
eliminate  the  perceived  conflicts  of  interest  between  rating  agencies  and  structured  securities’  issuers.  The 
proposal prohibited rating agencies to rate the issue of such securities, if no information is available about the 
assets that guaranteed them, as well as structuring the same products that they valued. It also demanded the 
public dissemination of information used by rating agencies in determining the rating of a structured product, 
including information about the assets that these were guaranteed by.  
o  Recommendations to reduce pro-cyclicality of bank capital related procedures, provisioning, 
valuating and indebtedness.  
o  Prudential  supervision  -  in  January  2009,  the  BCBS  made  proposals  to  improve  risk 
assessment procedures under the Basel II capital requirements including improved instruments and securitized 
off-balance sheet exposures. These measures are part of a broader strategy to strengthen regulation, supervision 
and risk management of banks with international activity to address weaknesses brought to the surface by the 
crisis. The strategy also includes measures to improve the firmness and quality of capital and to reduce pro-
cyclicality.  A  group  of  international  and  national  prudential  supervisors  is  working  to  strengthen  the 
infrastructure of OTC derivatives markets, with steep edges implementation of a central counterparty for CDS 
clearing. The European Union implemented such consideration in 2008, expecting that number to increase in 
2009 both the EU and the U.S. (IMF, 2009 and G-20, 2009). 
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o  Compensation schemes and risk management. A working group of the FSF has developed a set 
of sound practices for compensation schemes. The BCBS and national regulatory bodies have issued guidelines 
to improve risk management practices in several areas that tests response to stress factors, risk concentration, 
off-balance sheet exposures, evaluation, and liquidity risk. (G-20, 2009)  
o  Transparency. The IASB (6) and FASB (7) have established a consultative group composed of 
leaders  with  extensive  experience  in  financial  markets  to  provide  recommendations  to  the  two  councils  on 
matters related to accounting systems arising from the crisis. Moreover, the IASFC (8) validated in January 
2009, established a formal link with the new External Monitoring Council, composed of public authorities. 
Members  have  also  approved  the  extension  of  the  IASB  to  16  members  and  have  developed  new  lines  of 
guidance related to the geographical diversity of the members (G-20, 2009).  
  In addition to their core mandate, regulators, central banks, supervisory authorities, and international 
financial bodies (IASB, BCBS, IAIS and IOSCO) should take into account the financial system stability. The 
authorities concerned should ensure they have the tools at their disposal to limit the accumulation of imbalances, 
which might lead to financial instability. Analysis of these instruments before their implementation should be 
conducted  in  a  comprehensive  manner,  taking  into  account  the  interaction  between  the  various  instruments 
considered. Within each country, it is proposed an efficient collaboration between different authorities for proper 
evaluation of the domestic financial system to assess systemic risk in the financial system and to coordinate 
national  policies  in  response  to  possible  occurrences  of  systemic  risk.  The  structure  of  this  coordination 
mechanism should be transparent, with clear tasks and responsibilities for each authority.  
 
  Once  the  conditions  in  the  financial  system  recover,  international  standards  relating  to  capital  and 
liquidity requirements should be enhanced, promoting the consistent provisions and reserves, in order to absorb 
losses in more difficult times (IMF, 2009). Through the expanded powers of the Financial Stability Forum, 
International Monetary Fund and other international bodies that give financial standards, international standards, 
including the macro prudential regulations, the scope of capital adequacy and liquidity must be coordinated to 
ensure common and coherent international framework that the national financial authorities should apply. It 
promotes the publication of  periodic review and validation of supervisory and regulatory framework of the 
financial system (G-20, 2009). 
  As mentioned previously, in January 2009, the BCBS conducted proposals to improve risk assessment 
procedures under Basel II, giving rise to the Basel III Project. Basel III aims to reconfigure the entire regulatory 
and supervisory framework for banking activities, with emphasis on early warning component of the risk of 
escalation. Concrete proposals for new international regulatory framework, supervision and risk management in 
the banking sector were presented in December 2009. The measures proposed in this project are defined by two 
complementary axes: micro and macro prudential, having as objectives: (i) the enhancement of the banking 
sector’s ability to absorb shocks caused by economic and financial turbulence, (ii) improving risk management 
systems and (iii) enhancing transparency of banking practices and the degree of dissemination of information. It 
is designed to combine capital and liquidity standards. 
  The transition to the new requirements in Basel III is expected to be done in a period of 5 years, so that 
their introduction is planned for 2013 and full implementation by the end of 2017. The implementation requires a 
significant period of transition because the new regulations will introduce requirements for significant amounts 
of additional capital over current requirements and the transitional arrangements are designed to ensure that 
banks can meet the new standards by deductions from income and capital gains without affecting the lending 
process. However, the international banking community has differing views regarding the immobilization of 
larger amounts of capital requirements, arguing that profitability will be reduced not only for banks, but at the 
same  time, inevitably they  will reduce the  flow of funds in  the  form of loans,  thus contributing to lower 
economic growth. 
  The BCBS (BIS, 2010) examines the benefits and costs of increased capital and liquidity requirements, 
in terms of their impact on production. Thus, the main benefits of a stronger financial system reflects a lower 
probability of occurrence of banking crises and their associated losses, since a stronger banking system helps 
reduce the magnitude of any crisis. Another benefit identified results in a reduction of amplitude fluctuations in 
production levels during periods of stability. To determine the costs, the analysis assumes that greater restrictions 
relating to capital lead to increased cost of bank credit. Thus, the costs identified are related to increase lending 
rates  likely  to  lead  to  a  downward  adjustment  of  production,  however,  without  affecting  the  trend  of  the 
economic growth rate. 
  While empirical estimates of costs and benefits are subject to uncertainty, the analysis suggests that, in 
terms of impact on production there is sufficient space for tighter capital and liquidity requirements,  while 
providing positive net benefits. However, it is recognized that the cost-benefit analysis at the macroeconomic 
level is dominated by uncertainty, since one approach is considered to be unable to capture all the implications of 
such regulations in terms of behavior such as banks and in the economy overall. 
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Conclusions  
  One lesson derived from the current crisis is that effective supervision at the individual level, although 
necessary, is not sufficient to protect the soundness of the financial system as a whole. This underlines the need 
for enhanced regulation and supervision in order to ensure more effective monitoring and addressing risks posed 
by excessive liquidity, excessive debt, systemic risk and high degree of concentration financial system. 
  Given that, the risks to the financial system are not simply the sum of their individual components; the 
impact of collective behavior of economic agents should be considered explicitly. An example can be found in 
the increased indebtedness of a bank in a period of economic expansion. This increased risky behavior can be 
viable at the individual level, but when this behavior is widespread, the overall indebtedness of the banking 
sector can create potential for financial instability. Thus, micro and macro-prudential authorities must assess the 
situation  differently.  Increased  indebtedness  cannot  be  regarded  as  a  micro  concern,  if  it  is  supported  by 
appropriate  safety  measures  at  institutional  level,  for  example,  by  adequate  capital.  However,  even  if  such 
safeguards are appropriate for a particular institution, prudential regulation may still be concerned about the 
potential emergence of a systemic imbalance, resulting in a  widespread increase in the indebtedness of the 
banking sector. As another example, if the behavior of individual institutions acting in the financial markets is 
subject to capital requirements for securities transactions, risk management practices, rules and practices relating 
to requirements for safety margins, this may lead to pro-cyclicality in financial market prices. 
  A challenge for policymakers is to ensure the appropriate balance between micro and macro-prudential 
approach to supervision of the financial process. Traditional  micro surveillance objectives  must be pursued 
vigorously to maintain financial stability as stressors affecting the financial system are likely to be less frequent 
– and with more reduced costs - if individual institutions are well managed, the markets are working effectively 
and if the infrastructure of the financial system is robust 
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